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Canadian courts have become far more willing in recent years to rely on the
common law as a source of new police powers. Where once the test from R. v.
Waterfield1 was an exception and an afterthought to what was otherwise the
general rule of insistence upon statutory sources for police powers, more recently that test seems to be in the forefront of judges' minds as they decide
cases. That 1963 British decision has been cited by Canadian courts roughly as
often in the last eight years as in the first 35 years after it was decided.2 Since
1999 the Supreme Court of Canada has relied on Waterfield to create three new
common law powers: in R. v. Godoy* with regard to entering an apartment to
investigate a disconnected 911 call, and twice in R. v. Mann4, first to authorize
investigative detentions, and secondly to authorize a limited power to search
during an investigative detention.
This article will not focus on whether greater reliance on common law police
powers is in itself a good or bad thing, though that is certainly a real debate.
Rather, the focus of this article will be on the corresponding impact of this
greater reliance on the issue of the exclusion of evidence following a Charter
violation. In particular, it will be argued here that the increase in the use of
common law police powers creates a reciprocal obligation to supervise the use
of those powers after the fact. This in turn requires a subtle shift in the understanding of "good faith" in the s. 24(2) analysis, a shift which can be seen to be
starting.
To see how this connection arises, however, it is important to understand the
arguments for and against common law powers. Essentially, the dispute over
common law police powers hinges on the balance between individual liberty and
effective policing. When police powers are defined very precisely in advance,
then individual citizens have a greater capacity to know the limits of the ability
of the police to interfere with individual liberty. Individuals are therefore freer to
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choose to comply, or not comply, with police demands. Such an approach
favours liberty, but at the possible expense of effectiveness. If police are provided with only an exact and clearly delimited range of powers, then situations
can arise where they are powerless to act. It is easy to see that one could stray
too far either in ignoring effectiveness to protect liberty or in making police
effective by ignoring liberty.
The case against common law powers has been put in brief best recently by
Justice LeBel, dissenting in R. v. Orbanski5:
fSl The adoption of a rule limiting Charter rights on the basis of what
amounts to a utilitarian argument in favour of meeting the needs of police
investigations through the development of common law police powers would
tend to give a potentially uncontrollable scope to the doctrine developed in
the Waterfield-Dedman line of cases, which — and we sometimes forget
such details — the court that created it took care not to apply on the facts
before it R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.)). The doctrine
would now be encapsulated in the principle that what the police need, the
police get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the legislature finds the adoption of legislation to be unnecessary or unwarranted. The courts would limit
Charter rights to the full extent necessary to achieve the purpose of meeting
the needs of the police. The creation of and justification for the limit would
arise out of an initiative of the courts. In the context of cases such as those
we are considering here, this kind of judicial intervention would pre-empt
any serious Charter review of the limits, as the limits would arise out of
initiatives of the courts themselves.
f82 We must bear in mind the differing constitutional functions and responsibilities of the courts on the one hand, and of legislatures on the other. Also,
legislatures are better equipped to investigate and assess the need for enhanced police powers and to integrate required changes into the relevant statutory scheme as a whole. In this constitutional context, where the use of the
operational requirement concept is relevant, a more prudent approach to the
interplay between the concept and Charter values and rules would appear to
be advisable. Otherwise, the lodestar of our constitutional law would become
the needs of the police, which would be a new coda to the old Latin dictum
"Salus reipublicae suprema lex". In the present appeals, this is in fact the gist
of the prosecution's argument. It comes down to a few propositions: By statute, the police already have the undisputed power to stop drivers at the roadside. They have the duty and power to check the drivers' sobriety. For this
purpose, they must be authorized to conduct case-specific investigations in
the course of which they must be allowed to use the most appropriate methods in the circumstances. . ..
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On the other hand the case in favour of common law police powers has been put
in Brown v. Durham Regional Police Forced
Those who prefer hard and fast rules are troubled by the fact-specific nature
of the ancillary power doctrine as enunciated in Waterfield, adopted in
Dedman and applied in Simpson. Obviously, clear and readily discernible
rules governing the extent to which the police can interfere with individual
liberties are most desirable. The infinite variety of situations in which the
police and individuals interact and the need to carefully balance important
but competing interests in each of those situations make it difficult, if not
impossible, to provide pre-formulated bright-line rules which appropriately
maintain the balance between police powers and individual liberties. In any
event, a controlling statute or reconsideration by the Supreme Court of Canada, the ancillary power doctrine is the established means by which the
courts must draw the line between police conduct which is lawful and that
which amounts to an unconstitutional interference with individual
liberties...

A central factor affecting where society should place itself along the liberty/effectiveness spectrum is the amount of trust that we place in the ability of
those to whom power is given to use that power responsibly and in the way it
was intended. Where power is given to those in whom we have little confidence,
very little discretion should be given to the actors. On the other hand where we
have complete confidence in the actor, we can feel comfortable giving far
broader powers than are actually necessary, in the expectation that the actor will
only use those powers in the manner intended.
This dichotomy is particularly true given the recent evolution of the Waterfield
test. Earlier Supreme Court of Canada decisions used Waterfield to create new,
but relatively specific, powers. After Dedman,1 one could say that police had the
power to set up random stops to check for drunk drivers. After Godoy, one could
say that the police had the power to enter a residence to investigate a disconnected 911 call. Although these powers were only affirmed after the fact and
therefore inhibited the predictability of the law,8 they provide for future cases
pretty precise and clear guidance.
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for example, might have thought to himself "these officers have no statutory
authority to enter my apartment without my consent, and so they will not be acting in the
execution of duty if they try to do so — in that case I won't be resisting an officer in the
execution of duty if I try to prevent them". It is unlikely that these precise thoughts went
through his mind at the relevant time, but if they did, it would have been a perfectly
reasonable — indeed, one might have said correct — understanding of the law at the
time. Once the ancillary power doctrine was applied to create the new power, however,
he was guilty nonetheless.

On the other hand Mann has not so straightforwardly used the ancillary powers
doctrine to create a new power: one cannot accurately make the simple statement that the police now have the legal authority to make street-level stops for
investigative purposes. The ruling in Mann is more sophisticated than that. The
case does require as a minimum that the officer must reasonably believe that
there is a clear nexus between the individual to be detained and a recent or ongoing criminal offence. However, police do not automatically have a power to
detain when those criteria are met: "[t]he overall reasonableness of the decision
to detain, however, must further be assessed against all of the circumstances,
most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary to perform the officer's duty, the liberty interfered with, and the nature
and extent of that interference, in order to meet the second prong of the
Waterfield test".9 What Mann has really created is an analytical framework
rather than a power. Further, it is not a framework intended just to be used by
judges after the fact in assessing police action, but more importantly to be used
by police at the time they are deciding whether to detain.
In that event, the Mann use of Waterfield is an even greater delegation of authority to police than other uses of the ancillary powers doctrine. Rather than creating a new and limited power for the police, Mann invites the police to be the
decision-makers exercising discretion to decide whether they ought to have the
new power in particular circumstances or not.
It is the link between liberty and effectiveness that ties common law police powers to exclusion of evidence. To adopt a more open approach to common law
police powers is to place greater advance trust in the ability of police to act in
good faith. It is the potential for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the
Charter, and especially consideration of whether the police have indeed acted in
good faith, that allows post facto review of whether the police have deserved
that trust.
In particular exclusion of evidence is the only real mechanism available (other
than not expanding the availability of common law police powers, of course) to
ensure that police behave as Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force hopes
they will and "carefully balance important but competing interests", rather than
as LeBel J in Orbanski fears they will and assume that "what the police need,
the police get".
Good faith has always been a flexible concept within s. 24(2), and courts have
applied it in a number of ways.10 Some cases have treated good faith as the mere
absence of bad faith, and have therefore held either that a lack of malice is a
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factor favouring admission, or have held that a failure to act in good faith is not
automatically bad faith, and therefore is not necessarily a factor favouring exclusion." Similarly, there has been confusion over whether bad faith requires a
conscious decision by police to ignore the limits on their powers, or whether
simple ignorance of the limits of those powers is sufficient. To a certain extent,
it is only relatively recently that courts have begun carefully distinguishing between these two situations.
In R. v. Buhay12, for example, the police conducted a warrantless search of a bus
station locker, and the Court decided that the evidence had to be excluded because of the seriousness of the breach. At one point the Court relies on a conscious decision to ignore limits as a justification for exclusion:
61 In this case, the admission by Constable Riddell that he thought there
were insufficient grounds to obtain a warrant can properly be viewed as fatal
to a claim of good faith. This admission clearly reveals that the police officer
made the choice to avoid the legal requirements of obtaining a warrant even
on his own assumption that one might be required.

However, the Court also notes elsewhere that "lax police procedures" can help
justify exclusion, and concludes that:
64 As indicated earlier, the police officers' casual attitude towards the warrant requirement appears to have been the determinative factor for the trial
judge. The evidence supports this finding. The officers appear to have
thought that getting a warrant was nothing more than a technical requirement
that in this case may have been unnecessary or unavailable if. indeed, they
thought about constitutional requirements at all, (emphasis added)

That is, a failure to think about limits on power, rather than a conscious decision
to ignore those limits, can also both destroy a good faith claim and be a factor
favouring exclusion.13
This latter consideration, that the police have an obligation to think about the
limits on their powers, has been put in other ways. R. v. Mitchell, reported ante
p. 289, notes the rule, stated in Mann among other cases, that police cannot
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claim good faith where they have made an unreasonable mistake about the extent of their powers:
32 In the present case, one cannot even make a credible argument that the
error in question arises from "an entirely reasonable misunderstanding of the
law". This is because there is nothing to misunderstand. Moreover R. v. Coslake has been on the books since January of 1998. A period of nearly eight
years has passed and yet the police's only explanation for their ignorance of
the law is that they were ignorant. Should a plea of good faith be accepted in
these circumstances? In my opinion, the answer to that question must be no.

Similarly in R. v. Rutten, also reported ante p. 311, the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal excluded evidence after finding that the breach was serious since "the
police disregarded well settled law in relation to the limits of a legal search and
the requirements for valid consent".14 Equally in R. v. Calderon15 the Ontario
Court of Appeal excluded evidence which was obtained after a right to counsel
violation despite "over a decade of consistent law from the Supreme Court of
Canada and this court, that these rights must be given".16 In particular in Calderon the court noted that "[although the police's misconduct may not support a
finding of deliberate or wilful breach, it does suggest an ignorance of the law,
which is hardly consistent with good faith".17
It is this latter observation that points to the evolution in the current understanding of good faith in considering exclusion of evidence, as well as the further
direction in which the rule ought clearly to develop. The growing trend to see
the good faith requirement as placing greater emphasis on the positive obligation
for the police to remain current on the state of the law should apply with particular regard to limits on common law powers.
In R. v. Buhner^, for example, the accused was arrested for traffic offences but
the arresting officer then searched the accused's car. This was precisely the example used in R. v. Caslake^ of an impermissible search, when the Court was
articulating the limits on the common law power to search incident to arrest. The
Court of Appeal excluded the evidence, noting:
31 The recent decision in Buhay also reflects the Supreme Court's concern
with the effect of admitting evidence that may encourage particular conduct
by police in the future. When considering the effect of the exclusion of the
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evidence on the administration of justice, a court must determine if further
disrepute will result from the admission of evidence by "judicial condonation
of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and prosecutorial agencies"
[emphasis in original] This is such a common occurrence, i.e., police officer
stops vehicle in relation to a minor traffic offence, that the limits should be
clearly understood, (second emphasis added)20

It is true that one can see the foundations of this approach from very early stages
of Charter analysis. In R. v. Wong21, the Court noted, as a reason not to exclude
evidence, that the police had conducted an unreasonable search "before they had
had a reasonable opportunity to assess the consequences of the Charter on their
established practices".22 In R. v. Kokesch2^, the Court relied on the fact that
police either knew or should have known they were trespassing to reject a good
faith claim: the Court noted in particular in that case:
I do not wish to be understood as imposing upon the police a burden of instant interpretation of court decisions. The question of the length of time after a judgment that ought to be permitted to pass before knowledge of its
content is attributed to the police for the purposes of assessing good faith is
an interesting one, but it does not arise on these facts. The police here had
the benefit of slightly more than twelve years to study Eccles, slightly less
than six years to consider Colet, and slightly more than two years to digest
the constitutional warrant requirement set out in Hunter. Any doubt they may
have had about their ability to trespass in the absence of specific statutory
authority to do so was manifestly unreasonable, and cannot, as a matter of
law, be relied upon as good faith for the purposes of s. 24(2).

Nonetheless it seems reasonable to suggest that courts are far more frequently
relying on this consideration in looking at s. 24(2) in recent years, and that this
greater emphasis is the flip side of the greater trust placed in police good faith
through expanded used of the ancillary powers doctrine to create common law
powers. The clearest indication of this connection, of the rationale for insisting
on police advertance to the limits on their power, and explicit recognition that
courts are not intending to give them "whatever they need" is found in R. v.
Clayton25. The police in that case had set up a roadblock, though no statutory
power to do so existed. After concluding that, although it was reasonable in
principle to set up a roadblock, the police had gone beyond what was necessary
on the facts, the Ontario Court of Appeal decided to exclude the evidence. They
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noted in particular the casual attitude of the police towards the appropriate limits
on their common law powers:
183.. .The evidence at trial did not even suggest, much less demonstrate, that
the police when setting up the roadblock stop directed their minds to the
analysis required by the ancillary power doctrine. They did not advert to the
factors relevant to the exercise of their ancillary power and make a considered decision to proceed after balancing the pros and cons of doing so. To
the contrary, the evidence reveals that the officers who set up the roadblock
stop were sadly ignorant of the limits of their ancillary powers or the need to
balance the demands of their duties against the interference with individual
liberties caused by their actions. Furthermore, and in my view this significantly aggravates the seriousness of the breach, the evidence indicates that
this ignorance is institutional and is a direct consequence of the training these
officers received, or more to the point, the inadequacy of the training they
received.

189 Having read the evidence of Constables Dickson and Robson, I am
struck by the failure of their training to address in any way the limits of the
ancillary power doctrine. This court, and others including the Supreme Court
of Canada, have endeavoured over at least the last decade to articulate the
ancillary power doctrine in a way that is consistent with both the principles
protected by the Charter and in the community need for effective law enforcement. In interpreting that doctrine, the courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in policing, where officers face an infinite variety of fact
situations and often must make quick decisions. The case-specific approach
developed in these authorities has not penetrated the training of the officers
involved in this case. The testimony of these officers strongly suggests that
their police force has made no effort to embed the approach to the ancillary
power doctrine adopted by the courts into police training. This systemic failure would suggest that the court must deliver its message in a more emphatic
way. The exclusion of evidence may provide that added emphasis.
Simply put, that approach is exactly right. Expanding the use of common law
police powers is only advisable and justifiable where the actors given such expansive powers demonstrate that they can use them with restraint. Exclusion of
evidence is the only effective means of reviewing whether the police have in
fact shown such restraint.
It should be observed that at a very early point the Court observed in R. v.
Genesi26 that "the purpose of s. 24(2) is not to deter police misconduct".27 Of
course despite that ruling it has remained true that more serious police misconduct is more likely to result in exclusion, since "seriousness of the breach" is
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one of the legitimate considerations. In this particular context, the justification
for excluding based on police behaviour is even stronger than in most cases.
Although the goal is certainly to affect police behaviour, it is not in the crude
sense that because the police misbehaved in some fashion, evidence will be excluded to somehow "punish" them. Such a "two wrongs make a right" approach
does not in the long run serve the interests of society or individuals. In this context, however, there is a direct relationship between the granting of common law
powers, which is premised on the ability to act in good faith, and consideration
of good faith in deciding whether to exclude. The exclusion question allows a
chance to review whether the decision to grant common law powers was a wise
one.
Where broad discretionary powers are given, "good faith" must encompass a
positive obligation on the part of the police to actively consider the limits on,
and exercise self-restraint in the use of, those powers, and courts are well-advised to continue further down this road in interpreting s. 24(2).

